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Abstract
We construct a general equilibrium trade model of a two-class small open
host or source country. When consumption tax revenue finances the
provision of a public good, marginal migration reduces social welfare in
the source country and raises it in the host. When consumption tax
revenue is equally distributed among domestic households in each
country, then migration has an ambiguous impact on social welfare in
either country. When tariff revenue in either country is either equally
distributed among domestic households, or it is used to finance the
provision of a public good, then migration has an ambiguous effect on
social welfare in the host country, and is expected to reduce social welfare
in the source.
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Welfare Effects of Migration in Societies with Indirect Taxes, Income Transfers
and Public Good Provision
1. Introduction
Within the neo-classical trade literature, it has been established that finite
permanent migration is welfare beneficial to the nationals of the host country and
welfare detrimental to the non-emigrants in the source country, and that marginal
permanent migration has no welfare effects in either country.
1 This result holds,
regardless of the number of goods or factors of production, or of whether commodity
prices are endogenously determined or exogenously fixed (see Wong 1985, Quibria
1988). Recent contributions to this literature have provided cases where the above
results can be reversed, e.g.,  Djajic (1986) in a model allowing for immigrant
remittances, and Djajic (1998), in a model with traded and non-traded goods, and
foreign capital.
In general, these neoclassical trade results have shown migration induced
welfare gains to the host countries, despite certain losses to native workers substitutes
for the immigrants. Contrary to this theoretical evidence, however, there is a
widespread resistance against immigrants in host countries. Moreover, this resistance
has been directed primarily towards unskilled, rather than skilled, immigrants who, as
it is argued, exert downward pressures on wages in the host countries, and fiscally
burden, at the expense of all domestic households, the host country’s “welfare state”.
2
That is, often it is argued that gains from trade associated with immigration are small
relative to the increased costs of redistribution policies when transferring income from
high-income natives, to low-income, fiscally beneficiary immigrants, since they
cannot be excluded from or discriminated against from consuming  congestable or
quasi-private public services, such as health care, and public schooling.
                                                                
1 Permanent emigration is defined in the sense that immigrants do not remit any part of their income
earnings back to the source country, and that their consumption and utility are part of the respective
magnitudes in the host country. The other type of international migration considered in the relevant
international trade and development literature is temporary migration. In that case, immigrants are
viewed as guest workers in the host country, who remit their income earnings back to the source
country, and whose consumption and utility are part of that country's consumption and welfare. For the
distinction between permanent and temporary migration, and for its analytical implications see, among
others, Wong 1995.
2 For example,  Sala-i-Martin (1995) notes the argument against migration due to human capital
externalities derived from human interaction.2
In line to these concerns it is only recently that models of international
migration have departed from the notion of distortions free theoretical settings, and
have explicitly incorporated an active government engaged in redistribution policies
through income transfers. For example, Wildasin (1994) in a single commodity model
with income taxes and transfers demonstrates, among other things, the possibility of
migration induced Pareto-inferior outcomes when in the no-immigration situation,
owners of the immobile factor are being taxed to provide transfer payments to mobile
workers. Razin and Sadka (1995) use a two-class --high productivity (skilled) labor,
and low productivity (unskilled) labor-- model of international migration, where the
government uses a redistribution policy (i.e., an egalitarian income tax and a lump-
sum grant) in order to maintain the pre-migration level of disposable income
(consumption) of native born unskilled workers. Within their context it is shown that
free migration is Pareto-inferior for the native born population. Wellisch and Wildasin
(1996), assuming that prices of goods are fixed, examine within a system of
jurisdictions the effect of immigration in one jurisdiction. They show, among other
things, that when each jurisdiction chooses optimal redistribution policies, the
external effects are purely fiscal, that is, immigrants who make net fiscal payments
(receipts) create external benefits (costs). Wellisch and Walz (1998) show that social
welfare in countries with relatively small number of low-skilled native workers is
higher with free trade than with free migration due to redistribution of income
towards immigrating workers. Finally, Michael (1999) using a two-class model with
many traded and non-traded goods and where income taxes finance income transfers,
show that marginal emigration (immigration) benefits (hurts) those left behind
(already in the country).
We argue, however, that two equally important considerations may still be
missing from the above reviewed literature on the fiscal repercussions of international
migration. First, governments in addition to income transfers and  congestable or
quasi-private public services, they also provide non-congestable public consumption
goods or public inputs (e.g., national defense). Second, aside of income taxes equally
important sources of generating government revenue, to finance such government
activities, have been consumption taxes, and particularly for the  LDCs tariffs.
3
                                                                
3 For example, during 1990 in India income taxes accounted approximately for the 15.5 percent of
government revenue, while domestic taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international trade
accounted respectively for the 35.5 and 28.8 percent. In Pakistan, the respective percentages were 10.0,3
Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1998) examine the welfare implications of marginal
migration when income taxes finance the provision of pure public good in a two-class
economy, and show that, under plausible assumptions, emigration (immigration) hurts
(benefits) those left behind (already in the country). The welfare implications of
migration, however, when the provision of public goods or the income transfers are
financed through consumption or trade taxes are unexplored.
 4
Motivated by this realization, the present paper constructs a general
equilibrium trade model of a two-class, i.e., internationally immobile capitalists and
prospective emigrant workers, small open source country, or of a two-class,  i.e.,
internationally immobile natives and immigrant workers, host country. Capitalists and
natives are endowed with a unit of labor and other factors of production, while
workers are only endowed with a unit of labor. The country produces two private
traded goods, while its government is assumed to generate revenue by levying
consumption taxes or tariffs. In turn, such revenue is either used as an income transfer
equally distributed to domestic households, or it is used to finance the provision of an
imported, and not locally produced, pure (non-congestable) public good.
5 Within this
framework, we examine the effects of marginal international migration on class and
social (i.e., capitalists and workers, natives and immigrants jointly) welfare under the
two government tax policies, and under their assumed alternative uses.
2. The Model
Consider a small open economy producing two private traded --one exported
and one imported-- goods, and importing a public consumption good ) (g  which is not
produced locally.
6 Labor and other factors of production such as capital and land are
used in the production of the two private traded goods. It is assumed that the other
                                                                                                                                                                                         
32.2 and 30.6. On the other hand, in developed countries, e.g., the U.K. the respective percentages were
40.3, 30.8 and 0.1, while in Sweden 18.1, 28.9 and 0.5 percent, respectively (World Bank, 1992).
4 A considerable volume of the public finance literature is devoted to the issue of optimal taxation
(income and commodity taxes) and public good provision in closed economy models (e.g., see Stiglitz
1982, Christiansen 1984, Nava et al. 1996).
5 Such income transfers are primarily in the form of congestable or quasi-private public goods such as
health care, education, etc., and rarely in the form of lump-sum cash transfers. We assume that the
country treats  all individuals equally, regardless of their origin. For a more extensive discussion of this
issue, see for example Wellisch and Wildasin (1996).
6 The assumption that the public good is imported is made for simplicity, since now the unit cost (=unit
price) of the public good is constant and is not affected by changes in factor supplies or public good
provision. In section 6 where we examine the welfare effects of migration within the Heckscher-Ohlin
(H-O) model, this assumption is irrelevant since within this model changes in factor supplies or public
good provision do not affect factor rewards and the unit cost of public good. That is, within the H-O
model, the results of the analysis are same when either the public good is imported or locally produced.4
factors of production are internationally immobile, labor is imperfectly mobile
internationally. As a result, the rate of return to labor is not equalized between a labor-
exporting, source, country or a labor importing, host, country and the rest of the
world. International trade in goods can either be free or subject to tariffs. Since the
country is small in world markets, changes in domestic policies and labor flows
cannot affect the world prices of goods and the world rates of returns to factors of
production.
Domestic endowments of factors are fixed. The domestic supply of other
factors equals their fixed endowments, but the domestic supply of labor ) (L is variable
due to international migration. Thus, assuming full employment  dL is negative with
emigration in the case of a source country, and it is positive with immigration in the
case of a host country. Production functions are homogeneous of degree one and
strictly concave to all factors.
The private sector, producing the traded goods is assumed to behave
competitively. The public sector (government) is assumed to levy consumption taxes
or import tariffs. Revenue from such taxes is assumed to be either equally distributed
among domestic households, or used to finance the provision of the imported public
consumption good that is provided to people free of charge. Furthermore, we consider
as a benchmark case, the financing of the provision of the public good through pure
lump-sum taxes.
Let  ) , ( L q R  be the maximum value of the private gross domestic product
(GDP), given the producer domestic relative price of the taxed good  ) (q , and the local
supply of labor  ) (L . When consumption taxes are levied,  qequals 
* p  the world price
of the taxed commodity. When a tariff is the implemented policy instrument,
t p q + =
* , where t is the tariff rate. For the rest of the analysis, treating t as constant
q is omitted from the GDP function. The  ) (L R  function is assumed strictly concave
in  L (i.e.,  LL R is negative).
7 Its partial derivative with respect to p (i.e., Rp) is the
supply function of the imported good, and with respect to  L(i.e.,  L R ) is the marginal
revenue product of labor, which in equilibrium equals the domestic rate of return to
labor.
                                                                
7 In the two private-traded good, two-factor, Heckscher-Ohlin trade model  0 = LL R .5
We assume that the small open source or host country comprises of two
groups of identical individuals. In the source country prospective emigrants and
capitalists, and in the host natives and immigrants. Capitalists and natives are assumed
to posses a unit of labor and other factors of production. Prospective emigrants and
immigrants are assumed to posses only one unit of labor. Migration is from the class
of workers, and it is assumed to be permanent in the sense that immigrants do not
remit any of their income earnings back to the source country, and that their utility is
part of the host country’s welfare.
8
We denote by  ) , , (
j j u g p e ,  w k j , = , the minimum expenditure of a
representative capitalist  ) (k  or worker  ) (w  required to achieve a level of utility 
j u ,
given the consumer domestic relative price of the taxed good  ) (p , and the level of
public good consumption  ) (g . When consumption taxes are levied,  t + =
* p p ,
where  ) 0 (> t is the consumption tax rate, while when a tariff is the chosen policy
instrument  t p q p + = =
* ) ( . The partial derivative of the representative expenditure
function with respect to  ) ., . (
j
p e e i p is the compensated demand function for the taxed
good by a representative capitalist or worker. Following standard practice of the
public finance literature, we call  ) 0 (> -
j
g e the individual “marginal willingness to pay
for the public good” in group  j ( e.g., see King, 1986). Since, again, consumer
domestic relative prices are treated as constant, henceforth  ) (p  is omitted from the
representative minimum expenditure functions.
The country’s income-expenditure identity requires that total spending by its
residents must equal total income from the production of private traded goods plus
any consumption tax or tariff revenue accruing to them, minus lump-sum taxes. That
is:





w w w k k k - + + = + ) , , , ( ) , , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( b at ,    (1)
                                                                
8 We assume, for simplicity, that emigrants do not remit income back to the source country, and that
their welfare is not part of that country’s welfare.  Source countries, however, do care about the well
being of their permanent emigrants, who quite often remit, part of their earnings back to the source
country.6
where 
j L  is the total number of individuals in the  j
th group, 
w k L L L + = ,




p = ) , ( g u e L
w w
p
w + is the country’s aggregate consumption of the taxed






p R e L e L Z - + =  is its aggregate import demand, and T is the lump-
sum tax per individual in the country. Under consumption taxes (i.e., T= 0 = t ), a is
the fraction of this revenue equally distributed to domestic households. Under tariffs
(i.e.,T= 0 = t ),  b is the fraction of tariff revenue equally distributed to domestic
households (see for more details Appendix A).
The income-expenditure identity of the class of workers requires that their
aggregate expenditure equal income from labor service plus any equal proportion of







w w w w TL L g u u tZ L L g u u E L L R L g u e L - + + = ) , , , ( ) / ( ) , , ( ) / ( ) , ( b t a . (2)
Given this specification a representative worker has the incentive to migrate if total
income earned in the host country (i.e., labor income plus possible fiscal benefits due
to redistributed tax revenue minus lump-sum taxes) exceeds the corresponding
income in the source country.
We complete the model by introducing the government budget constraint.
When the government provides the public good, financed through a consumption tax
or a tariff or a lump-sum tax, its budget constraint requires that revenues from such
taxes must equal the cost of the public good. That is:




p - + - + - = ) , , , ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) 1 ( b t a ,                     (3)
where  Bdenotes the government net tax revenue and for simplicity it is assumed that
the price of the public good equals one. We assume that in equilibrium the
government maintains a balanced budget (i.e.,  0 = B ).
Following the specification of equations (1), (2), and (3), our analysis
examines the effects of international migration on group and social welfare in a
source or in a host country, under the following five policy regimes. First, when only
lump-sum taxes exist (i.e., t= 0 = t ), and the tax revenue finance the provision of the
public good. Second, when consumption taxes are imposed (i.e.,T= 0 = t ) and revenue7
from such taxes (i) is equally distributed among domestic households (i.e.,  1 = a ), or
is entirely used to finance the provision of the public good (i.e.,  0 = a ). This analysis
is also repeated when the government uses only tariff revenue (i.e., T= 0 = t ) which is
either equally distributed among domestic households (i.e.,  1 = b ), or used to finance
the provision of the public good (i.e.,  0 = b ).
3. Migration, Lump-Sum Taxes and Welfare
First, we consider the benchmark case where no tariff or consumption tax
exists and the government finances the provision of the public good using lump-sum






w w w e TL R L dL du L - = ) / (  ,                                                                    (4)





w k k e TL R L dL du L - - =                                                                    (5)
T E dL dg dL dW g - = = ) / ( E -   ) / ( g                                                                 (6)
where  ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( dL du L dL du L dL dW
w w k k + = , and by choice of units we assume




u e e .
The dW is the change of the sum of utilities of the initial residents of the host country,
or those left behind in the case of the source country. We call dW the change in social
welfare. We use a social welfare function with weights given by the number of
individuals in each group and with the same and equal to one marginal social utility of
income for all individuals.
Equations (4) and (5) capture, in the present context of a lump-sum tax, the
effects of international migration on the welfare of non-emigrant workers and
capitalists in the case of the source country, or of natives and migrants in the case of
the host country. International migration affects group welfare through a wage-effect
and through, what we call, net revenue change public good effect. Equation (6) shows
that international migration affects the social welfare of the source or of the host
country through changes in the level of public good provision. 
Consider the case of the source, labor exporting, country where due to
emigration  0 < dL . Equations (4) and (5), indicate that the emigration induced wage-8
effect has a negative impact on the welfare of capitalists, and a positive one on the
welfare of non-emigrant workers. This is because emigration raises the marginal
revenue product of labor, and thus wage rate in the source country. Therefore, income
of capitalists’ decreases by  LL
wR L  and that of workers increases by  LL
wR L . At the
same time emigration reduces the lump-sum tax revenue, and thus the level of public
good is reduced, affecting negatively, through the induced net revenue change public
good effect, the group (i.e., 
j
g
je TL ) and social (i.e.,  T Eg ) welfare. Thus, emigration
reduces the capitalists and social welfare while the effect on workers welfare is
ambiguous.
For the host country, marginal immigration has the opposite effects. That is,
an inflow of a foreign worker increases the welfare of natives and social welfare and
has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of immigrants.
9
Proposition 1: Consider a small open source or host country, where a public good is
financed through lump-sum taxes. Marginal emigration decreases social and
capitalists welfare while the effect on workers welfare is ambiguous. Similarly for the
host country, marginal immigration increases social and natives welfare while the
effect on migrants welfare is ambiguous.
When the lump-sum tax revenue are equally distributed to all individuals, then
marginal permanent migration induces only the wage-effect. In this case emigration
increases workers welfare and decreases that of capitalists, while immigration
increases natives’ welfare and decreases that of migrants. In both cases social welfare
is not affected by marginal international migration.
4. Migration, Welfare and Consumption Taxes
In this section we examine the welfare effects of international migration on
group and social welfare in a source or host country, when the government’s policy
instrument is only a consumption tax, and tax revenue is either equally distributed
among domestic households, or it is used to finance the provision of a public
                                                                
9 When we talk about the effect of migration on the social welfare in the host (source) country, we
basically mean the effect of migration on the welfare of those already in the country (those left behind).9
consumption good.
10 Differentiating equations (1), (2), and (3), and letting  0 = = t T ,
we obtain equations (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) of Appendix C.
4.1 Equal distribution of consumption tax revenue
In this case there is zero provision of the public good. Letting  1 = a , and
0 = dg  in equations (C.1) and (C.2), and eliminating equation (C.3), we obtain the



















p R L e e L E e dL dW ) ( )] / ( [ ) / ( - + - = D t t ,                                        (9)
where ) / ( L L




pu e e tm m t - - - = D ) 1 ( 1  is positive. Equations (7) and (8)
capture, in the present context of a consumption  tax, the effects of international
migration on the welfare of capitalists and non-emigrant workers, respectively, in the
case of the source country, or of, respectively, natives and migrants in the host
country. International migration affects group welfare through a  wage-effect and,
what we call, a tax-revenue-effect (direct and a wage change-induced-tax-revenue-
effect). Equation (9) shows that international migration affects social welfare of a
source or of a host country through an induced tax-revenue-effect. 
Consider the case of the source, labor exporting, country where due to
emigration  0 < dL . Equations (7) and (8), respectively, indicate that the emigration
induced wage-effect, similar to the one in the case of lump-sum taxes, has a negative
impact on the welfare of capitalists, and a positive one on the welfare of non-emigrant
workers.
The emigration wage change-induced-tax-revenue-effect on group welfare is
positive for capitalists ( i.e., 
w
pu LL
w e R L t ), and negative on welfare of non-emigrant
workers ( i.e., 
k
pu LL
w e R L t - ). Intuitively, as noted above the  wage-effect reduces
incomes of capitalists by  LL
wR L  and raises income of non-emigrant workers by this
                                                                
10 When we say that revenue is equally distributed among domestic households, we mean, among other
things, that people are eligible to consume the same amount of congestable public services such as
health care, public schooling, etc.10
amount. As a result, consumption of capitalists decreases by 
k
pu LL
w e R L , affecting
negatively consumption tax revenue that is distributed and welfare of non-emigrant
workers. On the other hand, consumption of non-emigrant workers increases by
w
pu LL
w e R L , affecting positively the distributed consumption tax revenue by  LL
w w
pu R L e t
and welfare of capitalists by  LL
w w
pu R L e t
1 - D .
Since  ) 1 (
w
pu e t - and  ) 1 (
k
pu e t - are both positive, then observing equations (7)
and (8) the combined wage-effect and wage change-induced-tax-revenue-effect affect
negatively the capitalists welfare ( i.e.,  0 ) 1 ( > - - LL
w w
pu R L e t ), and positively the
welfare of non-emigrant workers (i.e.,  0 ) 1 ( < - LL
w k
pu R L e t ).
In the absence of consumption tax revenue, the income gain to workers due to
emigration exactly offsets the income loss of capitalists and thus social welfare is not




pu e e „ , then as a result of
emigration, and group income change, total consumption changes, and so does
consumption tax revenue. Consequently, as shown by the second right hand side term
of equation (9), emigration, through the wage change-induced-tax-revenue-effect, has




pu e e ) (< > .
That is, emigration, which raises wages to non-emigrant workers, affects positively
(negatively) social welfare if that group’s marginal propensity to consume the taxed
good exceeds (is smaller than) the corresponding marginal propensity of consumption
of capitalists.
Equations (7) and (8), respectively, indicate that the emigration induced direct
tax-revenue-effect (i.e.,  )] / ( [ L E e p
w
p - t ) entails a positive and a negative impact on
group welfare. The positive impact is due to consumption tax revenue forgone by an
emigrant worker (i.e.,  ) / ( L E p t ). Now, due to emigration, a fraction  ) 1 ( m -  of this
revenue is equally distributed among the country’s capitalists, and the remaining  m
among its non-emigrant workers. The negative impact of the direct tax-revenue-effect
is due to lost consumption tax revenue contributed by an emigrating worker (i.e.,
w
p e t ), which if it were not for emigration would have been equally distributed, at a
fraction (1- m) among the country’s capitalists and the remaining  m among its non-
emigrant workers. Thus, if the average consumption of the taxed good is larger11
(smaller) than the consumption of a typical emigrant worker (i.e., 
w
p p e L E ) ( ) / ( < > ),
emigration, through the direct tax-revenue-effect, entails a fiscal benefit (loss) that
affects positively (negatively) the welfare of all households, i.e., capitalists and non-
emigrant workers, left behind. In other words, if the consumption of the taxed good
by a typical capitalist is larger (smaller) than that of a typical worker, then emigration
through the  direct  tax-revenue-effect, benefits (hurts) those left behind. Thus,
equations (7) to (9) indicate that the emigration induced  direct  tax-revenue-effect





p e e > , and negatively otherwise.
11
Equivalently, in the case of a host, labor-importing, country, immigration
increases domestic labor supply (i.e.,  0 > dL ). As a result, the induced direct tax-




p e e > , positively
otherwise. Migration also lowers wages to immigrants. Thus, the combined wage-
effect and wage change-induced-tax-revenue-effect affects positively the welfare of
natives, negatively the welfare of immigrants already in the country, and has an
ambiguous impact on social welfare.
Proposition 2: Consider a small open source or host country where consumption tax




p e e > , then marginal emigration
(immigration) increases (decreases) welfare of non-emigrant workers (immigrants)





p e e < , then international migration has an ambiguous effect on
workers welfare in either country, while it reduces (raises) welfare of capitalists








pu e e > , then international
migration increases (decreases) social welfare in the source (host) country.
In most countries governments usually impose high consumption taxes on
luxury goods, for which the more affluent capitalists (natives) have higher marginal




pu e e > ), and low or zero
taxes on necessities. Thus, the last term on the right hand side of equation (9) is
                                                                






p e e L E e - - = - m .12
expected to be positive. At the same time consumption of the taxed good is expected
to be greater by the more affluent capitalists in the source country, and natives in the
host, compared to the corresponding levels of consumption of workers and
immigrants, respectively, in the two countries ( i.e., 
w




p e e > ). Thus, the first right-hand-side term of equations (7) to (9) is expected to be
negative.
Therefore, under such plausible assumptions and within the present context,
we expect  that international migration raises the welfare of workers in the source
country, and reduces welfare of immigrants in the host. On the other hand, its effect
on the welfare of capitalists in the source country, of natives in the host, and on social
welfare in either country is ambiguous.
4.2 Consumption taxes and public good provision
Letting  0 = a ,  0 > g , and  0 > dg  in equations (C.1) to (C.3), we obtain the
welfare effects of international migration on group and social welfare, with
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w w w g u L B g B E R L dL du L ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ - = D
-
) / ( ) / )( / (
1 L B g B g u L
w w ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ -
-                                        (10´)
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w k k g u L B g B E R L dL du L ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ - - = D
-
) / ( ) / )( / (
1 L B g B g u L
k k ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ -
-                                        (11´)







g g e R L e e E dL dg dL dW t t + - = D = D                  (12)
where  
1
1 ) / (
- ¶ ¶ D = D g B
g g , 
g D  is the determinant of the matrix of coefficients with
endogenous variables  ) , , ( g u u
k w in equations (C.1) to (C.3) when  0 = a . The13
determinant 
g D  is negative if an increase in the level of public good provision reduces
net government revenue.
12
Using equation (C.1)  0 ) / ( > - = ¶ ¶
j
g
j j j e L g u L . Using equation (C.3)
0 ) / ( > = ¶ ¶
w
p e L B t , and  0 ) / ( > = ¶ ¶
j
pu
j j e u L B t . That is, government net tax revenue
is an increasing function of the level of employment and group income. Finally, using
again equation (C.3),  ) 1 ( ) / ( - = ¶ ¶ pg E g B t . The following Assumption facilitates the
comparative statics analysis of this section:
Assumption (1): Government net tax revenue is a decreasing function of the level of
public good provision, i.e.,  0 ) / ( < ¶ ¶ g B .
13
Equations (10´) and (11´) indicate that international migration affects group
welfare through three effects. The first right-hand-side term of the two equations (i.e.,
LL
wR L ) is the previously referred to as the wage-effect. The second right-hand-side
term (i.e.,  ) / ( ) / (
1 j j
g u L B g B E ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ -
- ) we call the income change-induced public-
good-effect, and the last right-hand-side term (i.e.,  ) / ( ) / )( / (
1 L B g B g u L
j j ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ -
- )
we call the net revenue change-induced-public-good-effect. Equation (12) indicates
that the effect of international migration on social welfare is through the induced
changes in the provision of the public good.
Consider the case of the source country where emigration, among other things,
raises the marginal revenue product of labor, and the wage rate. As a result,
emigration, through the induced wage-effect, affects positively the welfare of non-
emigrant workers, and negatively the welfare of capitalists. In the case of a host
country the induced wage-effect exerts a negative impact on the welfare of immigrants
already in the country, and a positive effect on the welfare of natives.
                                                                
12 If in the system of equations (1), (2) and (3) we treat 
w k u u ,  and  B as the endogenous variables, and
g and  t as the exogenous, then   0 ) / ( > - = g E dg dW  and 
g dg dB D = ) / ( .  If at the
neighborhood of the equilibrium  0 > D
g , then given t , a small increase in public good provision
increases social welfare and the government net tax revenue, which in turn successively increases the
public good provision, utility and net tax revenue. Thus, if at the neighborhood of the equilibrium
0 > D
g , equilibrium is unstable.  Consequently, it is assumed that for given t , stability at least in the
neighborhood of the equilibrium requires that  0 ) / ( < = D dg dB
g .
13 Because of Assumption (1),  0 ) ) / ( (
1
1 > ¶ ¶ D = D
- g B
g g .14
In the case of the source country, under Assumption 1, the income changed-
induced-public-good-effect is negative on the welfare of the non-emigrant workers.
Intuitively, because of the emigration induced reduction in the real income of
capitalists, their consumption, and thus consumption tax revenue fall. This hinders the
government’s ability to provide the public good, which affects negatively the non-
emigrant workers welfare. On the other hand, the impact of the emigration through
this effect on the source country’s capitalists’ welfare is positive. Intuitively,
emigration increases the income of non-emigrant workers, increases consumption,
consumption tax revenue, and the provision of public good. Welfare of capitalists
increases through this effect. In the case of the host country, the income change-
induced-public-good-effect has the opposite impact on the welfare of immigrants, and
of natives. That is, through this effect, welfare of immigrants is affected positively
and of natives negatively.
Through the last term in equations (10´) and (11´) it is shown that, under
Assumption (1), the net revenue change-induced-public-good-effect due to emigration
entails a negative impact on welfare of both non-emigrant workers and of capitalists
in the source country. Intuitively, emigration reduces government net tax revenue
(i.e.,  0 ) / ( > ¶ ¶ L B ), which in turn, under Assumption (1), reduces the provision of the
public good. Then, group welfare is affected negatively due to lower consumption of
the public good. In the case of the host country, this effect affects positively the
welfare of natives, and of immigrants.
Lastly, as shown by equation (12) the effect of international migration on
either country’s social welfare depends on its effect on the provision of the public
good. Consider the case of the source country. Emigration reduces government net tax
revenue directly and indirectly if the workers marginal propensity of consumption of




pu e e > . Intuitively, when
a worker leaves the country, total domestic consumption is reduced directly by 
w
p e and
tax revenue by 
w
p e t . His emigration increases the income of the remaining workers
and reduces the income of capitalists. If the marginal propensity to consume the taxed
good by capitalists is greater than that of workers, then total consumption tax revenue
declines. Therefore, the level of public good provision and the joint welfare of non-





pu e e < , then emigration may increase social welfare in the source




pu e e > , international migration increases
the social welfare in the host country.
Proposition 3: Consider a small open source or host country, where a public good is




pu e e > , then marginal emigration




pu e e < ,
then emigration (immigration) may increase (may decrease) social welfare in the
source (host) country.
As previously conjectured, in most countries government usually impose high
taxes on luxury goods, for which the more affluent capitalists (natives) have higher
marginal propensities to consume than workers (immigrants), and low or zero taxes




pu e e t t > ). Thus we expect that emigration (immigration) reduce
(increases) social welfare in the source (host) country.
Finally, consider the special case where the consumption  and the marginal
propensity to consume the taxed good by a typical capitalist and a typical worker is
the same. In this case, social welfare in either country is not affected by marginal
migration when there is equal distribution of taxed revenue (see equation (9)), while it
decreases (increases) in the source (host) country when tax revenue finances the
provision of the public good (see equation (12)). Intuitively, the reason for this result
under the above assumptions is as follow. With equal distribution of tax revenue
social welfare is not affected by migration since (i) the migrant contributes to the tax
revenue exactly what he receives and (ii) tax revenue are not affected by income
redistribution among the two groups. In the case of public good provision, the
marginal immigration (emigration) increases (decreases) tax revenue by his tax
payments and thus it increases (decreases) public good provision and social welfare.
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5. Migration, Welfare and Tariffs
We now examine the effects of international migration on group and social
welfare in the source or in the host country, when the implemented policy is only an
import tariff, and government revenue from such policy is either equally distributed
among domestic households (i.e.,  1 = b ), or it is used to finance the provision of the
public good (i.e.,  0 = b ). Differentiating equations (1), (2) and (3), and letting
T= 0 = t , we obtain equations (D.1), (D.2) and (D.3) of the Appendix D.
5.1 Equal distribution of tariff revenue
Again in this case, there is no provision of the public good. Letting  1 = b  and
0 = dg  in equations (D.1) and (D.2), and eliminating equation (D.3), we obtain the
welfare effects of international migration on group and social welfare as follows:
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pu e t e t m m - - - = W ) 1 ( 1  is positive and  ) ) / ( ( pL p R R L = e , denoting the labor
elasticity of domestic supply of the imported good, is positive (negative) if
0 ) (< > pL R .
Equations (13) and (14) capture, in the present context of a tariff, the effect of
international migration on the welfare of capitalists and non-emigrant workers in the
source country, or of natives and of immigrants in the host country. Following the
analysis of the previous section, the impact of international migration on group
welfare is through the induced wage-effect, and through what we now call a tariff-
revenue-effect (direct and wage change induced-tariff-revenue-effect). Equation (15)
shows that international migration affects social welfare of the source or of the host
country through the induced tariff-revenue-effect.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
14 In general, from the viewpoint of existing residents in the host country immigration is more likely to
be beneficial when consumption tax revenue is used to finance the provision of a public good than
when is equally distributed to all individuals.17
Since a tariff is a consumption tax and a production subsidy, some effects of
migration on group and social welfare in the case of a tariff are identical to the ones
discussed in the case of a consumption tax. Thus, as shown by the last term of
equation (13) and (14), the migration induced  wage-effect and the  wage change-
induced-tariff-revenue-effect on group welfare are the same as in the case of a
consumption tax. Since, again,  ) 1 (
w
pu te - and  ) 1 (
k
pu te - are both positive, the combined
wage-effect and  wage change-induced-tariff-revenue-effect affect negatively the
capitalists welfare (i.e.,  0 ) 1 ( > - - LL
w w
pu R L te ), and positively the welfare of non-
emigrant workers ( i.e.,  0 ) 1 ( < - LL
w k
pu R L te ) in the source country. Similarly, the
second right hand side term of equation (15), is the same as the corresponding term in
equation (9) and thus emigration, through the wage change-induced-tariff-revenue-




pu e e ) (< > .
Equations (13) and (14), indicate that the  direct  tariff-revenue-effect of
international migration on group welfare can be decomposed to a consumption-
component (i.e.,  )] / ( [ L E e p
w
p - , that is the same as in the case of a consumption tax,
and a production component (i.e.,  )) / )( 1 ( L Rp e - which is the new effect, present only
in the case of a tariff. Through its consumption component, the direct tariff-revenue-
effect of emigration entails a positive impact on group welfare if 
w





p e e > . That is, if the average consumption of the imported good is
larger than the consumption of a typical non-emigrant worker, or if the consumption
of a representative capitalist exceeds that of a representative worker. Through its
production component, the direct tariff-revenue-effect entails a positive impact on
group welfare if the labor elasticity of domestic supply of the imported good is greater
than one ( i.e.,  1 > e ). In such a case, emigration, which reduces domestic labor
supply, raises imports and tariff revenue by reducing domestic supply of the imported
good. Since tariff revenue is equally distributed among capitalists and non-emigrant
workers, emigration through this effect exerts a positive impact on group and social18
welfare.
15 If any of the above conditions does not hold, then the direct tariff-revenue-
effect of emigration has an ambiguous impact on social welfare.
Similarly, in the case of a host, labor importing, country, immigration
increases domestic labor supply and lowers wages. As a result, the combined wage-
effect and the  wage changed induced tariff revenue effect, affects positively the
welfare of natives, and negatively the welfare of immigrants. The migration  wage




pu e e > , and positive one otherwise. Finally, immigration, through the direct tariff-
revenue-effect affects negatively group and social welfare if 
w




p e e > ), and  1 > e .
Finally note that social welfare increases (decreases) with immigration if it
increases  (decreases) the tariff revenue.
16
Proposition 4: Consider a small open source or host country where tariff revenue is




p e e >  and  1 > e , then emigration
(immigration) increases (decreases) welfare of non-emigrant workers (immigrants)




pu e e > , then international migration increases (decreases) social welfare in the
source (host) country. If any of these conditions does not hold, then international
migration has an ambiguous effect on social welfare in either country.
For most source,  LDCs the imported goods subject to tariffs are relatively
capital intensive manufactured goods ( i.e., 0 < e ) and are considered luxuries
                                                                
15 In a two-good, two-factor H-O model, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) have shown that in the
presence of a tariff welfare decreases with the factor inflow if the imported good is intensive in this
factor and the factor payments are repatriated untaxed. In terms of the notation of our model, the
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro effect is captured by  pL tR dL du - = W ) / ( . In our model however, this
effect is only part of the overall impact of marginal migration on group and social welfare. Note also
that, along with two groups of individuals, we assume permanent migration where there is no
repatriation of any factor income.
16 Note that in the two-good, two-factor H-O model, in the presence of a tariff, social welfare decreases
with an inflow of foreign workers if the imported good is relatively labor intensive (i.e., RpL>0) and
their earnings are repatriated untaxed. This result is due to the fact that in this case, a labor inflow
reduces the tariff revenue. In our model, when RpL>0, then the inflow of workers, increases production
of the imported good and exerts a downward pressure on tariff revenue. But, at the same time, it may
increase the consumption of the public good and thus imports and tariff revenue.19
compared to the exported agricultural goods.




pu e e <  and





p LR Z Le L L R L E e - - = - + - )] / )( 1 ( )) / ( [( e .  Then,  pL p
w
p LR Z Le - -  is
positive if imports are not greater than the product of the consumption of the imported
good by the representative worker multiplied by the total number of individuals in the
country (a sufficient but not necessary condition). The later condition is likely to hold,
since imports are a fraction of domestic consumption and thus the first right-hand-side
term of equations (13) to (15) is expected to be positive. Under these plausible
assumptions and within the present context, we expect that emigration would entail a
deteriorating effect on the welfare of capitalists, and on social welfare, while it would
have an ambiguous effect on the welfare of workers. On the other hand, in most host
developed countries the imported goods (e.g., food, cloth) are usually relatively labor




pu e e <  and the last
right hand side term of equation (15) is expected to be negative. The sign of the first





p LR Z Le L L R L E e - - = - + - )] / )( 1 ( )) / ( [( e ), is generally ambiguous,
making the total effect ambiguous. Thus immigration has an ambiguous effect on host
country’s welfare.
5.2 Tariffs and public good provision
  In this case, letting  0 = b ,  0 > g and  0 > dg  in equations (D.1) to (D.3), we
obtain the welfare effects of international migration on social welfare, as follows:
) / ( E -   ) / ( g dL dg dL dW






pu g R e t R L e e t E - + - =                  (16)
where 
g W , the determinant of the matrix of coefficients of the endogenous variables
) , , ( g u u
k w in equations (D.1) to (D.3) when  0 = b , is assumed negative (see the
discussion for the sign of 
g D  in footnote 10).
                                                                
17 In a standard H-O model, we can say that  0 ) (< > pL R if the imported good is labor (capital)
intensive. It is known, however, that beyond this model, while the concept of factor intensity is used, it
looses its rigor. In particular, in two-goods and three-factor trade models, an increase in one factor,
though quite unlikely, may reduce the output of the good intensive in this factor, or may increase the
output of both goods (e.g., see Jones and Easton 1983).20
The effect of migration on group welfare is given, respectively, by equations
(10´) and (11´), but now using equation (D.3) and letting  0 = b ,  ) 1 ( ) / ( - = ¶ ¶ pg tZ g B
is negative under  Assumption 1, and  ) ( ) / ( pL
w
p R e t L B - = ¶ ¶ . The following
Assumption facilitates the comparative statics analysis of this section.
 Assumption 2: Government net tax revenue is an increasing function of the level of
employment, i.e.,  0 ) / ( > ¶ ¶ L B .
In the remaining terms, t replaces t . Thus the relevant discussion of section 4.2
applies here as well.
   The effect of migration on social welfare is given by equation (16), and again
it depends on whether migration increases or decreases the level of public good
provision. Thus, emigration (immigration) decreases (increases) social welfare if it
decreases (increases) the tariff revenue and thus the public good provision.
Specifically, social welfare in the source country falls due to emigration when
(i) workers marginal propensity to consume the imported good is smaller than that of
the capitalists, and (ii)  0 < pL R . Under the above conditions, international emigration
reduces the source country’s social welfare.
Proposition 5: Consider a small open source or host country, where the provision of




pu e e > , and  0 < pL R , then




pu e e <  and/or  0 > pL R , then migration has an ambiguous effect on social welfare
in either country.
We again conjecture that in most source LDCs the imported, subject to tariffs,
goods are manufactured goods that are considered luxuries and are relatively capital




pu e e > , and thus we expect
emigration will reduce the source LDC welfare. In most host developed countries the
imported goods (e.g., food, cloth) are usually relatively labor intensive (i.e., 0 > pL R )




pu e e < . Therefore, while the effect of21
immigration on the level of public good and welfare in the host-developed country is
in general ambiguous, it is more likely to be detrimental in the case of tariffs.
6. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model.
To obtain a clearer interpretation of the general results presented thus far, we
consider the effects of international migration on group and social welfare, in the
present context of taxes, income transfers, or public good provision within the
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model.
Through the use of the above model we attempt to relate the previous general
results to the case of a typical source labor-exporting country or of a typical host
labor-importing country based on certain likely real world conjectures. First, labor-
exporting countries are, by and large, less developed countries ( LDCs), while
developed countries have mostly served as hosts. Second,  LDCs, historically, have
relied primarily on tariffs, and to a lesser extent on income or consumption taxes to
generate government revenue which in turn can finance other public sector activities.
To the same end, developed labor-importing countries rely mostly on the use of the
latter tax instruments. Third, imported, subject to tariffs, goods by LDCs are generally
capital intensive manufactured goods  ( i.e., 0 < pL R ).  Lastly, in most countries
governments usually impose high consumption taxes on luxury goods. We expect that
the level of consumption of the taxed good is greater by the more affluent capitalists
in the source country, and natives in the host, compared to the corresponding levels of
consumption of workers and immigrants, respectively, in the two countries ( i.e.,
w




p e e > ).
Within this model, two intersectorally mobile factors,  labor and capital, are
used in the production of the two commodities. In addition,  labor is imperfectly
mobile internationally, while capital is internationally immobile. In this context, it is
commodity prices that determine factor rewards ( e.g.,  RLL =0). Furthermore, we
assume that income transfers are financed through tariff revenue, or consumption tax
revenue in the source LDC, and through consumption taxes in the host developed
country. The public good provision in each country is financed with this type of tax
revenue and lump-sum taxes.
First, consider the case where consumption tax revenue is equally distributed
among households in either country. Given that in this model RLL=0, equations (7) to22
(9) indicate that international migration affects group and social welfare only through




p e e > , we expect that
immigration reduces the welfare of immigrants already in the country, of natives and
social welfare in the developed host country and we expect that emigration increases
the welfare of workers, of capitalists and social welfare in the source country.
Intuitively, the inflow of a worker increases consumption by 
w
p e and the consumption
tax revenue distributed to people already in the country revenue by 
w
p e t .  At the same
time, the immigrant gets a share ( L E p / t ) of the tax revenue which is a loss for the






p p e e or e L E > > ,
the loss is greater than the gain and thus group and social welfare decreases with
marginal immigration
For the source LDC, when tariff revenue is equally distributed, we expect that
RpL<0, and we conjecture that  pL p
w
p LR Z Le - -  is positive (see the discussion right
after Proposition 4). Thus, we expect that emigration will reduce the tariff revenue
and thus entail a deterioration of the welfare of workers, of capitalists and of social
welfare in the source country in the case of tariffs. Intuitively, an outflow of a worker
reduces tariff revenue distributed to those left behind since (i) domestic consumption
of the imported good and thus imports and tariff revenue are reduced and (ii) when
the imported good is capital intensive the outflow of a worker increases the
production of the imported good and thus imports and tariff revenue are reduced. At
the same time, the outflow of a worker increases the tariff revenue distributed to those
left behind by his forgone share (i.e., tZp/L). Under our assumptions, we expect that
the net welfare effect will be negative for those left behind.
Proposition 6: Consider a Heckscher-Ohlin small open source or host country where
consumption tax revenue is equally distributed among domestic households. Then,
under plausible assumptions marginal migration increases social welfare in the
source country and reduces it in the host. When, however, the source country uses
tariff revenue, then emigration is expected to reduce its social welfare.
Next consider the case where tax revenue is used to finance the provision of
the public good. When lump-sum taxes are used to finance the provision of the public23
good, equations (4)-(6) show that migration reduces group and social welfare in the
source country and increases them in the host. For the source LDC, where tariff
revenue is used to finance the provision of the public good, equations (10) to (12) can
be used to show that the effect of international migration on group and social welfare
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Because of the assumed attributes for the source country,  0 ) ( > - pL
w
p R e .
Equations (17) and (19) indicate that in this (H-O) model emigration reduces group
and social welfare by reducing the level of public good provision. Intuitively, the
outflow of a worker reduces the consumption of the imported good by 
w
p e  and thus
imports and tariff revenue are reduced. At the same time, the outflow of a worker
increases the production of the capital intensive imported good (i.e., RpL<0), reducing
further imports and tariff revenue. The reduction in tariff revenue reduces the
provision of the under-provided public good and thus social and group welfare is
reduced. By allowing in equations (17) to (19) for  0 = pL R , and for t to substitute for
t, we get the case where consumption tax revenue are used to finance the provision of
the public good. It can be easily concluded that migration increases the level of public
good and the group and social welfare in the host and reduces them in the source
country.
18
Proposition 7: Consider a Heckscher-Ohlin two-class small source (host) country
using lump-sum tax, tariff or consumption tax (lump-sum tax, or consumption tax)
                                                                
18 The literature on local public economics has examined, among other things, the effect on the local
public good provision when local governments tax the mobile factor. This lead to a tax competition
which results in lower taxes for the mobile factor and under-provision of public goods. In our case,
even though the analysis and the results are not strictly comparable, we see that the outflow of a factor
(maybe due to a lower income tax in the host country) leads to a lower provision of a public good.24
revenue to finance the provision of the public good. Then marginal international
migration reduces social welfare in the source country and raises it in the host.
7. Concluding Remarks
International migration affects factor supplies, factors productivity, thus factor
prices in source and host countries. In addition, a widely noted economic dimension
of international migration has been its induced fiscal impact in source and host
countries. Because of these effects, and given a source or a host country’s government
redistribution policies, the resulting income distribution after migration differs from
that of the pre-migration state. Such migration induced changes in income
distributions affect welfare in source and host countries. International migration also
affects the share of consumption of congestable public goods (e.g., health care, public
schooling). On the other hand, in the case of pure public goods (e.g., national defence)
this issue of congestability in consumption is not of concern. International migration
raises issues not only with regards to the consumption of such, congestable or not,
public goods, but also in terms of the commensurable contributions made by
immigrants, through the tax system, for their provision. Immigrants through their tax
payments raise tax revenue, and thus the host country’s ability to raise the provision
of  congestable and pure public goods. It is frequently argued, however, that such
immigrant tax contributions are not at par with immigrant levels of congestable public
good consumption. As a result, international migration burdens a host country’s
“welfare state” by raising the economic costs of various entitlement programs.  At the
other end of this spectrum, international migration may hamper a source country’s
ability to generate government tax revenue and provide congestable and pure public
goods. Although such, and other, migration induced fiscal and welfare considerations
have long dominated the national debates over migration policies, it is only recently
that some of these issues have been explicitly accounted for in theoretical models of
international migration. The purpose of this paper is to introduce some of the above-
unexplored issues into the international migration literature.
In concluding this section, we refrain from repeating the major results of the
paper, which are summarized in its propositions. Instead, we would like to relate some
these findings to the existing literature of international migration. According to this
literature, in the absence of taxes, income transfers and public goods, finite permanent
migration is welfare beneficial to the nationals of the host country, and welfare25
detrimental to the non-emigrants in the source country. Moreover, marginal migration
has no welfare effects. When income taxes are used to generate revenue for income
transfers, it has been shown that international migration benefits non-emigrants in the
source country, and hurts those already in the host country. When income tax revenue
finances the provision of a locally produced, non-tradable and under-provided public
good, then under plausible assumptions, international migration hurts non-emigrants
in the source country, and benefits those already in the host.
This analysis, under plausible assumptions pertaining to a typical source LDC
or to a developed host country shows the following: First, when consumption tax
revenue in either country is equally distributed among domestic households, then
marginal migration has an ambiguous impact on either country’s social welfare.
Second, when the consumption tax revenue in either country is used to finance the
provision of an imported but not locally produced public good, then emigration
(immigration) is expected to decrease (increase) social welfare in the source (host)
country. Third,  when tariff revenue in either country is either equally distributed
among domestic households, or it is used to finance the provision of an imported but
not locally produced public good, international migration has an ambiguous effect on
social welfare in the host country, and is expected to reduce social welfare in the
source. The analysis uses as a special case the Heckscher-Ohlin model to examine the
effect of international migration on group and social welfare in the source and host
country.
Summarizing the analysis of this paper, and the review of the relevant
literature, it becomes evident that the way governments in source or in host countries
raise tax revenue (e.g., income or consumption taxes, tariffs) as well as the way they
dispense of it (e.g., income transfers, provision of public goods) matter greatly for the
welfare effects of international migration.
Appendix A: Derivation of equation (1)
When the public good is entirely imported, the trade balance equilibrium
requires that the value, at world prices, of exports to equal the value of imports of the
imported private traded good and of the public consumption good. That is,
g Q D p D Q + - = - ) ( 2 2
*
1 1 ,                                                                        (A.1)26
where  i Q  and  i D , i=1,2 are respectively the quantities produced and consumed of the
two private traded goods. For simplicity it is assumed that the price of the public good
equals one. Note also that  p R Q = 2 and  p E D = 2 . Adding and subtracting  2 pD  in the
right-hand-side of (A.1), rearranging terms, and assuming that only consumption
taxes finance the provision of the public good, we obtain:
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Using equation (4) and the assumption that B=0,  g E D p p p - = = - t 2
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w w k k e L e L E L R + = = ) ( .                           (A.3)
Simple algebra can show that equation (A.3) also holds for the case where
only tariffs are used to finance the provision of the public good (i.e.,  1 , 0 = = b a ).
Appendix B: Migration, Welfare and Lump-sum Taxes
Differentiating equations (1), (2) and (3), and letting ￿=t=0, we get:
0 = + + dg E du L du L g
w w k k                                                                         (B.1)
dL R L dg e L du L LL
w w
g
w w w = +                                                                        (B.2)
TdL dg =                                                                                                      (B.3)
Appendix C: Migration, Welfare and Consumption Taxes
Differentiating equations (1), (2) and (3), and letting T=t=0, we get:
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Appendix D: Migration, Welfare and Tariffs
Differentiating equations (1), (2) and (3), and letting  0 = =t T , we get:
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where  pg pg E Z = , and  pL p R L R ) / ( = e .28
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